AWTPermission.java

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package java.awt;

import java.io.Serial;
import java.security.BasicPermission;

/**
 * This class is for AWT permissions.
 * An {@code AWTPermission} contains a target name but
 * no actions list; you either have the named permission
 * or you don't.
 *
 * <P>
 * The target name is the name of the AWT permission (see below). The naming
 * convention follows the hierarchical property naming convention.
 * Also, an asterisk could be used to represent all AWT permissions.
 *
 * <P>
 * The following table lists all the possible {@code AWTPermission}
 * target names, and for each provides a description of what the
 * permission allows and a discussion of the risks of granting code
 * the permission.
 *
 * <table class="striped">
 * <caption>AWTPermission target names, descriptions, and associated risks
 * </caption>
 * <thead>
 *   <tr>
 *     <th scope="col">Permission Target Name
 *     <th scope="col">What the Permission Allows
 *     <th scope="col">Risks of Allowing this Permission
 * </thead>
 * <tbody>
 *   <tr>
 *     <th scope="row">accessClipboard
 *     <td>Posting and retrieval of information to and from the AWT clipboard
 *     <td>This would allow malfeasant code to share potentially sensitive or
 *     confidential information.
 *   <tr>
 *     <th scope="row">accessEventQueue
 *     <td>Access to the AWT event queue
 *     <td>After retrieving the AWT event queue, malicious code may peek at and
 *     even remove existing events from its event queue, as well as post bogus
 *     events which may purposefully cause the application or applet to
 *     misbehave in an insecure manner.
 *   <tr>
 *     <th scope="row">accessSystemTray
 *     <td>Access to the AWT SystemTray instance
 *     <td>This would allow malicious code to add tray icons to the system tray.
 *     First, such an icon may look like the icon of some known application
 *     (such as a firewall or anti-virus) and order a user to do something
 *     unsafe (with help of balloon messages). Second, the system tray may be
 *     glutted with tray icons so that no one could add a tray icon anymore.
 *   <tr>
 *     <th scope="row">createRobot
 *     <td>Create java.awt.Robot objects
 *     <td>The java.awt.Robot object allows code to generate native-level mouse
 *     and keyboard events as well as read the screen. It could allow malicious
 *     code to control the system, run other programs, read the display, and
 *     deny mouse and keyboard access to the user.
 *   <tr>
 *     <th scope="row">fullScreenExclusive
 *     <td>Enter full-screen exclusive mode
 *     <td>Entering full-screen exclusive mode allows direct access to low-level
 *     graphics card memory. This could be used to spoof the system, since the
 *     program is in direct control of rendering. Depending on the
 *     implementation, the security warning may not be shown for the windows
 *     used to enter the full-screen exclusive mode (assuming that the
 *     {@code fullScreenExclusive} permission has been granted to this
 *     application). Note that this behavior does not mean that the
 *     {@code showWindowWithoutWarningBanner} permission will be automatically
 *     granted to the application which has the {@code fullScreenExclusive}
 *     permission: non-full-screen windows will continue to be shown with the
 *     security warning.
 *   <tr>
 *     <th scope="row">listenToAllAWTEvents
 *     <td>Listen to all AWT events, system-wide
 *     <td>After adding an AWT event listener, malicious code may scan all AWT
 *     events dispatched in the system, allowing it to read all user input (such
 *     as passwords). Each AWT event listener is called from within the context
 *     of that event queue's EventDispatchThread, so if the accessEventQueue
 *     permission is also enabled, malicious code could modify the contents of
 *     AWT event queues system-wide, causing the application or applet to
 *     misbehave in an insecure manner.
 *   <tr>
 *     <th scope="row">readDisplayPixels
 *     <td>Readback of pixels from the display screen
 *     <td>Interfaces such as the java.awt.Composite interface or the
 *     java.awt.Robot class allow arbitrary code to examine pixels on the
 *     display enable malicious code to snoop on the activities of the user.
 *   <tr>
 *     <th scope="row">replaceKeyboardFocusManager
 *     <td>Sets the {@code KeyboardFocusManager} for a particular thread.
 *     <td>When {@code SecurityManager} is installed, the invoking thread must
 *     be granted this permission in order to replace the current
 *     {@code KeyboardFocusManager}. If permission is not granted, a
 *     {@code SecurityException} will be thrown.
 *   <tr>
 *     <th scope="row">setAppletStub
 *     <td>Setting the stub which implements Applet container services
 *     <td>Malicious code could set an applet's stub and result in unexpected
 *     behavior or denial of service to an applet.
 *   <tr>
 *     <th scope="row">setWindowAlwaysOnTop
 *     <td>Setting always-on-top property of the window:
 *     {@link Window#setAlwaysOnTop}
 *     <td>The malicious window might make itself look and behave like a real
 *     full desktop, so that information entered by the unsuspecting user is
 *     captured and subsequently misused
 *   <tr>
 *     <th scope="row">showWindowWithoutWarningBanner
 *     <td>Display of a window without also displaying a banner warning that the
 *     window was created by an applet
 *     <td>Without this warning, an applet may pop up windows without the user
 *     knowing that they belong to an applet. Since users may make
 *     security-sensitive decisions based on whether or not the window belongs
 *     to an applet (entering a username and password into a dialog box, for
 *     example), disabling this warning banner may allow applets to trick the
 *     user into entering such information.
 *   <tr>
 *     <th scope="row">toolkitModality
 *     <td>Creating {@link Dialog.ModalityType#TOOLKIT_MODAL TOOLKIT_MODAL}
 *     dialogs and setting the
 *     {@link Dialog.ModalExclusionType#TOOLKIT_EXCLUDE TOOLKIT_EXCLUDE} window
 *     property.
 *     <td>When a toolkit-modal dialog is shown from an applet, it blocks all
 *     other applets in the browser. When launching applications from Java Web
 *     Start, its windows (such as the security dialog) may also be blocked by
 *     toolkit-modal dialogs, shown from these applications.
 *   <tr>
 *     <th scope="row">watchMousePointer
 *     <td>Getting the information about the mouse pointer position at any time
 *     <td>Constantly watching the mouse pointer, an applet can make guesses
 *     about what the user is doing, i.e. moving the mouse to the lower left
 *     corner of the screen most likely means that the user is about to launch
 *     an application. If a virtual keypad is used so that keyboard is emulated
 *     using the mouse, an applet may guess what is being typed.
 * </tbody>
 * </table>
 *
 * @see java.security.BasicPermission
 * @see java.security.Permission
 * @see java.security.Permissions
 * @see java.security.PermissionCollection
 * @see java.lang.SecurityManager
 *
 * @author Marianne Mueller
 * @author Roland Schemers
 */
public final class AWTPermission extends BasicPermission {

    /**
     * Use serialVersionUID from JDK 1.2 for interoperability.
     */
    @Serial
    private static final long serialVersionUID = 8890392402588814465L;

    /**
     * Creates a new {@code AWTPermission} with the specified name.
     * The name is the symbolic name of the {@code AWTPermission},
     * such as "topLevelWindow", "systemClipboard", etc. An asterisk
     * may be used to indicate all AWT permissions.
     *
     * @param name the name of the AWTPermission
     *
     * @throws NullPointerException if {@code name} is {@code null}.
     * @throws IllegalArgumentException if {@code name} is empty.
     */

    public AWTPermission(String name)
    {
        super(name);
    }

    /**
     * Creates a new {@code AWTPermission} object with the specified name.
     * The name is the symbolic name of the {@code AWTPermission}, and the
     * actions string is currently unused and should be {@code null}.
     *
     * @param name the name of the {@code AWTPermission}
     * @param actions should be {@code null}
     *
     * @throws NullPointerException if {@code name} is {@code null}.
     * @throws IllegalArgumentException if {@code name} is empty.
     */

    public AWTPermission(String name, String actions)
    {
        super(name, actions);
    }
}